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Poythress’s Trinitarian
Logic: A Review Essay

by Calvin Jongsma
Poythress, Vern Sheridan. Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western Thought. Crossway, 2013. 733 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4335-3229-0
In the “quick-summary” from an online video
taken at a Westminster Seminary dessert social
held a year ago to celebrate this book’s publication,
Vern Poythress claims, “This is a Christian approach to logic. It challenges everything in Western civilization from Aristotle onward. I believe
that logic is rooted in the Trinitarian character of
God, and nobody, virtually, has said that.” Again,
in words from early in the book itself, the author
asserts, “This foundation … in logic [for] the
Dr. Calvin Jongsma is Professor of Mathematics, emeritus,
at Dordt College. Over the past three decades he regularly
taught an introductory logic course for the philosophy department and a transition course in mathematics focused
on logic and proof.
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whole of Western thought has to be redone.” Providing a genuinely alternative Christian approach
to the logical basis of Western thought seems an
outrageously grand goal, but one that is worth examining in an essay review. Unfortunately, while
Poythress almost predictably promises more than
he delivers, I believe he also delivers more than he
should have promised.
One expects from the title of the book and the
blurb on the back cover that this work could be an
ideal (though massive) textbook for the beginning
study of logic at a Christian college or seminary,
so I will review it largely from that vantage point.
As I do for any such text, I will examine its approach, analyze its main components and ideas,
and see how these things are developed. After beginning with a few practical matters, I will focus
extensively on several substantive technical issues.
I will conclude by reviewing the theological matrix
in which the logic is embedded.
Educational Considerations
Logic does indeed treat topics typically appearing
in an introductory logic textbook: Aristotelian syllogistic logic (AL), propositional logic (PL), and
first-order predicate logic (FOL), among other
things. And it places the study of logic within a
broader Christian context. But, having taught introductory logic at Dordt College for over three
decades in both philosophy and mathematics
classes, I would not choose this as my textbook,
for a number of reasons.
From a practical point of view, Logic lacks a
sufficient supply and range of exercises to be con-

sidered a self-contained textbook. Each section
concludes with questions “For Further Reflection,”
but these are rather limited, and not enough of
them help students consolidate their understanding of the material. Moreover, the book is organized into 68 chapters and 22 appendices of varying lengths, with little pedagogical guidance for
how the various sections might be combined into
appropriate-sized lessons and units to be taught
and studied in a more formal educational setting.
It is even unclear how central some of the topics
might be; for instance, the Preface and the Part
headings make it seem as if PL and FOL might

Unfortunately, while Poythress
almost predictably promises
more than he delivers, I believe
he also delivers more than he
should have promised.
not be all that necessary for learning elementary
logic. And, since the author is so intent on providing A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation
of Western Thought, Trinitarian theology gets pride
of place. The more systematic technical material
(logic proper) doesn’t begin until 192 pages into
the book, and even then, it is often eclipsed by
theological reflections. Furthermore, as I will document below, there are a number of significant deficiencies in Poythress’s exposition of logic’s main
ideas and systems. At best, I would consider using
this book as supplementary reading on the theological perspective it espouses. For that purpose,
you can’t beat the price, for the author has posted
the entire text on his website as a searchable PDF
to be freely downloaded.
In addition to elementary classical logic,
Poythress touches on a wide range of topics not
ordinarily included in a first course in logic: Boolean algebra, lattice theory, the formal axiomatization of logic and mathematics, set theory and Russell’s Paradox, the theory of computability, Gödel’s
Completeness and Incompleteness Theorems,
model theory, intuitionistic logic, and modal

logic. These are mostly treated summarily in the
supplementary appendices, though a number of
them appear in the later chapters as enrichment
topics. While these areas are of interest to modern
logicians, I doubt that many will connect well with
the typical reader beginning to learn basic logic.
Their inclusion may reveal more about the author’s graduate training in abstract algebra (under
Garrett Birkhoff) and mathematical logic (under
Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke) than about any
pressing need to include them in an introductory
survey of logic.
Logical Content and Methodology
As indicated, Poythress’s academic pedigree is impeccable. A Putnam fellow in 1964, he received his
Ph.D. in mathematics from Harvard University in
1970. Poythress is obviously familiar with the logic
and the mathematical foundations he discusses.
Nevertheless, these credentials don’t guarantee that
he presents his material on logic in the most fitting
or up-to-date manner; nor does it keep him from
making some major mistakes.
Let me begin with a small but irritating stylistic
preference. Poythress notes in defining a concept,
such as the truth-functional connective or ( 235),
that he will use the conditional only if instead of
the fuller and more accurate biconditional if and
only if (hereafter, iff) because he finds the former
more natural/less pedantic. In my experience, he
is in a tiny minority on this; mathematicians (and
occasionally Poythress himself ) tend instead to use
the oppositely directed if as an informal substitute
where iff is called for. They do so because uninitiated students find the meaning of only if confusing; in fact, it seems to have tripped Poythress up.
After saying that the compound sentence p or q is
false only if both sentences p and q are false (i.e.,
if p or q is false, then both p and q are false), he
completes his truth-functional definition of p or q
by saying that otherwise it is true (i.e., if it is not
the case that both p and q are false, then p or q
is true—the logically redundant contrapositive of
the clause he just asserted), which, taken strictly,
still leaves open the truth value of p or q when both
are false—that could be true without violating the
definition.
More important problems surface in how
Pro Rege—June 2014
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Poythress perceives the central goals of logic and
how he subsequently tries to achieve them in developing the three main systems of formal logic.
Poythress never gives his reader a succinct definition of logic, though he formulates some statements by others that he seems to accept: logic
aims to codify the basic forms of valid reasoning
and to point out some common fallacious/counterfeit forms so that a knowledgeable practitioner
can properly analyze and evaluate arguments. In
accord with this view, Poythress notes that logic
is largely and rightly unconcerned with the truth
and specific meaning of the statements involved
in an argument (material irrelevance), focusing
only on whether the premises logically imply the
conclusion—though he, like some, may want to
place logic within the larger context of seeking and
communicating the truth about whatever is being
investigated.
I am not unhappy with emphasizing valid argumentation and logical implication as central
to logic, but Poythress adheres to this viewpoint
rather unevenly, and this emphasis fails to cover
two other key concerns of logic. In opposition to
this goal of validity, but only superficially so, logic
is also intensely interested in the notions of truth
and logical truth, since they are tied to a criterion
for validity and can be used in a certain sense to articulate some basic laws of logic. Strangely enough,
as we will see, although Poythress doesn’t identify
truth at the outset as a central concern of logic,
this becomes almost his sole interest when he turns
to consider PL and FOL.
A third main aim of any system of logic is to
provide an adequate inferential basis for constructing conclusive arguments. This aim requires one to
choose and use a set of inference rules for making
deductions. Concentrating only on logical implication is insufficient; derivations or proofs provide
a level of logical discourse that goes beyond valid
argument forms. Poythress does present a number
of deductions in the book, but too few of these illustrate how rigorous derivations can be constructed using rules of inference, and so opportunities
are lost for showing students the value of what is
being studied. Deductions of conclusions from
premise sets ought to be presented for each system
of logic on the basis of an appropriate inferential
8
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infra-structure that validates their construction,
but these are largely missing.
Once a logic’s system of inference rules for deducing conclusions is stipulated, one can also investigate two meta-logical properties tied to this:
whether the system of logic is deductively sound
(whatever can be deduced from a premise set using
the inference rules is logically implied by the premises)
and whether it is deductively complete (whatever is
logically implied by a set of premises can be deduced
from them via the inference rules). Poythress does
explore some of these properties in his treatment
of PL and FOL, but he does so in a rather narrow
way, as we will note further below.
Before discussing those modern systems, however, let’s look briefly at how Poythress presents AL.
Since traditional syllogistic logic was the reigning
system of logic for almost 2200 years following
its inception in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (c. 330
BC), students should get to know a version of this
system if they want to understand what Western
thinkers long considered deductive reasoning to
be, whether they accepted it as foundational (e.g.,
Aquinas) or challenged it as useless (e.g., Bacon
and Locke). Poythress does discuss the various
forms of syllogistic inference, but he focuses mainly on the four most basic first-figure moods—
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio (Chapters 26
- 29)—relegating the other 20 valid moods to the
appendices (A2 and A3).
In addition to establishing the validity of the
basic forms via Venn Diagrams, Poythress explores
their logical interrelationships by deducing them
one from another (Chapter 28). In order to do
this, he must make use of some (unidentified) immediate inference rules (Obversion rules as well as a
Double Negative rule), which he treats as pertaining
to sentence retranslation rather than to the deduction process per se. Furthermore, in comparing the
syllogistic form Darii with its stronger counterpart
Barbara, he acts as if the former is a special instance
of the latter and should therefore be accepted; but
of course this conclusion doesn’t follow. The conclusion of Darii can, in fact, be deduced from its
premises using Barbara as an inference rule, but
in addition, a number of other rules and proof
strategies must be employed (Reductio ad Absurdum [RAA] along with Obversion and Conversion;

else RAA along with the second-figure form Camestres suffices, without Barbara). Poythress later
(Appendix A2) shows conversely that Barbara can
be derived from Darii, but he again uses RAA and
some immediate inference rules, still treating the
latter as relevant to rephrasing statements instead
of inferring with them. His deductions thus form a
patchwork of sentence inter-translations, proof by
contradiction (without setting out the traditional
Square of Opposition), and syllogistic conclusions.
Syllogistic logic is a wonderful first system to
explore with students because, in addition to its
historical significance, it relates well to everyday
kinds of argumentation. Also, it can be used to
nicely and simply illustrate the main concerns connected to any formal system of logic: validity (assessed by Venn Diagrams and counterarguments),
derivations (using some system of inference rules),
soundness, and completeness. Poythress considers
only validity for AL and ignores the other matters: he rarely presents an argument that goes beyond a simple syllogistic form, and the fact that he
never identifies a basic set of inference rules to be
used for constructing deductions means he is unable even to entertain the potential soundness and
completeness of AL.
When Poythress begins systematically to study
PL and FOL in Chapters 39 and 50, he seems to
forget his earlier circumscription of the purposes
of logic (valid arguments, logical implication).
Now his aim seems instead to be to identify and
derive all logical truths or tautologies, statements
like the Law of Excluded Middle, “p or not-p,”
which are always true, under any interpretation of
the sentence p. Truth tables naturally provide an
effective means for showing this for PL, but, evidently following Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, Poythress chooses to treat PL
primarily as an axiomatic system of tautologies. To
derive complex logical truths from a chosen set of
axioms, one must use just two rules of inference,
Modus Ponens and Substitution. The first rule is
crucial for constructing all sorts of garden-variety
arguments, but it functions primarily here in the
restrictive context of deriving tautologies from
tautologies. Such derivations can be extremely artificial, long, and complicated, even for rather simple results. Poythress thus expands his list of infer-

ence rules to a more natural collection, originally
proposed to capture the ways we typically reason
in mathematics and elsewhere, but he continues
to use them as a means for deriving logical truths
as theorems. This is far too narrow a focus for an
introductory logic course. Students (along with
mathematicians) aren’t really interested in proving
logical truths from axioms; they want to use inference rules to deduce conclusions from premises,
none of which are typically logical truths. Moreover, operating within Poythress’s constrictive
view of deduction, one finds that the properties of
soundness and completeness are likewise limited
to claims about logical truths.
Given the understanding that a major (even if
not the sole) goal of logic is to study valid argumentation, an introductory text ought to clearly
explain when a set of premises logically implies its
conclusion, or, to put it in other words, when a
conclusion logically follows from or is a logical consequence of its premises. This is something that
can and should be discussed first in general terms,

Given the understanding that
a major (even if not the sole)
goal of logic is to study valid
argumentation, an introductory
text ought to clearly explain
when a set of premises logically
implies its conclusion, or, to
put it in other words, when
a conclusion logically follows
from or is a logical consequence
of its premises.
proposing broad intuitive criteria, but it should
also be specialized for each system of logic under
consideration. Logic is inadequate on both counts.
Two common criteria for testing logical implication make use of the notions of truth-values under all interpretations (a conclusion logically follows
from a set of premises iff it must be true whenever the
Pro Rege—June 2014
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premises are) and information content (a conclusion
logically follows from a set of premises iff the information contained in the conclusion is already contained
in/doesn’t go beyond the premises). Poythress never
highlights these (or any other) principles as criteria for deciding whether a conclusion is a logical
consequence of a set of premises, though they lie
behind how one evaluates arguments as valid or
invalid for all the systems of logic. For instance,
the information-content criterion justifies the use
of Venn Diagrams to represent and test syllogistic
reasoning, but this background is never explicitly
spelled out. Instead Poythress appeals to the theological doctrine that “the persons of the Trinity
indwell one another” (203), a truth that he claims
provides an “uncreated foundation for [the] spatial
relations” exhibited by these diagrams. Similarly,
the above truth-value criterion (with its side-kick,
counter-arguments) provides the necessary foundation for evaluating valid arguments in PL and
FOL, but Poythress doesn’t explore this criterion
much for either system, presumably because his
strong interest in logical truth leaves little room
for other concerns.
A reader of Poythress’s Logic may feel I’m being unfair in claiming that PL lacks a proper focus
on validity and implication. After all, doesn’t the
text analyze logical implication and logical equivalence in some detail when it introduces the if-then
and the iff connectives? Sadly, no. What Poythress
does instead by presenting these PL connectives as
formally capturing the meaning of logical implication and logical equivalence is to perpetrate a serious error that an elementary logic text ought to
forestall and oppose, not propagate. Poythress may
be following Whitehead and Russell here, too, for
their early twentieth-century work is a historically
important source for this regrettable equivocation.
As Poythress correctly notes early on, whether
a conclusion logically follows from a premise set
doesn’t depend on the actual truth values of the
statements; it depends upon the interrelationship
of their logical forms. On the other hand, whether
a conditional statement is true completely depends
upon the truth values of the sentences involved.
That alone should alert one to the fact that logical
implication cannot be encapsulated by the conditional PL-form if p then q (nor logical equiva10
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lence by the form p iff q), not even if you factor
in some sort of fuzzy idealization process. The real
connection is actually captured by an important
meta-logical result that can be used to motivate or
justify the peculiar conventional truth-functional
definition given for the conditional connective
if-then (if p then q is true just in case q is true or
p is false). This result is a semantic version of the
Herbrand-Tarski Deduction Theorem: a premise
p logically implies its conclusion q iff the associated
conditional if p then q is logically true. Poythress
nowhere alerts his reader to this important linkage.
He instead obscures the connection by glibly reading the conditional sentence if p then q as asserting p implies q, thereby reinforcing the confusion
instead of dispelling it. Naturally there are times
when Poythress mentions logical implication and
logical equivalence when that really is what he
wants, but his identification of these semantic relations with logical operators within PL is a category
mistake. Collapsing a meta-logical semantic claim
into a particular syntactically formed statement
inside PL is analogous to identifying the relation
of divisibility in number theory with the operation
of division.
Logical implication is relevant, of course, for
much more than single-premise arguments in PL
(something Poythress fails to emphasize), but in
the context of that system of logic, full-fledged
implication is best explicated by means of an extended truth table, showing that whenever a valid
argument’s premises are jointly true, so is its conclusion. No such table for or analysis of a valid argument is to be found in Logic. Poythress chooses
instead to derive a conclusion from its premises by
means of a deduction, but then only for statements
that are tautologies proved from the system’s axioms. Using an extended truth table in this context,
where all statements are logical truths, would be
rather silly; the conclusion is always true, whatever
the truth value of the premises—nothing really
needs to be checked except the truth value of the
conclusion.
There are other difficulties with Poythress’s
technical development of logic, but I will note
only one more—his treatment of completeness.
Logic has several notions of completeness, and the
terminology for naming them has not been fully

standardized. Poythress takes up a couple of these,
which I will call deductive completeness and theory
completeness. Deductive completeness, defined
above, is a system-dependent property of the logic
under consideration: a formal system of logic is deductively complete iff whatever is logically implied by
a set of premises can be deduced from them using the
inference rules chosen for the system. Well-designed
variants of both PL and FOL are deductively complete, an important result first proved by Gödel
in 1929. Theory completeness, on the other hand,
is a property of a theory rather than of the logic
involved in developing it: in semantic terms, a set
of axioms is theory complete iff its logical consequences form a maximally consistent set; i.e., iff for any
proposition formulated in the language of the theory,
either it or its negation (but not both) logically follows

Since Poythress insists on
developing modern logic in the
style of Whitehead and Russell,
as an axiomatic system, he has
the possibility of examining PL
and FOL from both points of
view, but he fails to do either
satisfactorily.
from the axioms. Since Poythress insists on developing modern logic in the style of Whitehead and
Russell, as an axiomatic system, he has the possibility of examining PL and FOL from both points
of view, but he fails to do either satisfactorily. Naturally, these systems of logic (as theories) are not
theory complete. Logical statement forms include
more than logical truths and contradictions: it is
not the case for a primitive sentence P that either it
or its negation not-P must be a tautology. In contrast, however, these systems of logic (as logic) are
deductively complete; but here Poythress must be
content with what we might call weak deductive
completeness: whatever logical truth follows from
the stipulated axiomatic basis (all such truths, of
course) can be derived from the axioms. Whether

this result can be parlayed into the stronger, more
interesting and desirable claim about the logical
consequences of any premise set being derivable is
never discussed. Logic is de facto about truth, it
seems, not validity.
After noting that PL and FOL are (weakly) deductively complete, Poythress proceeds to explore
whether mathematics is complete. Here he also appeals to Gödel, this time to his two Incompleteness
Theorems (1931). Unfortunately for the unsuspecting novice, Poythress has subtly shifted to a second
meaning of completeness, which he never defines,
treating the new idea almost as if it were the same
as or an extension of the former. He notes loosely
that “any ordinary set of axioms for arithmetic is
incomplete in the logical sense” (424), and he later
equates an axiom system being complete with the
possibility of deriving true results from the axioms
(451), which in the absence of any further distinction is reminiscent of deductive completeness. Actually, what Gödel proved in his first theorem (refined by Rosser in 1936) was that if arithmetic is
logically consistent, then it is not theory complete:
one can generate sentences in the language of
arithmetic that cannot be proved or disproved. But
this does not mean, as one might falsely conclude,
that there are arithmetic statements (FOL-) implied by the axioms that cannot be (FOL-) proved
from them—FOL remains deductively complete
when used for arithmetic as well as for any other
theory. One can naturally claim, as Poythress does,
that there are unprovable true arithmetical statements, but then one must tacitly take the notion
of being arithmetically true in an absolute systemindependent or extra-systemic sense while keeping
the notion of provability restricted to the formal
system of logic being employed. Regardless, the
conceptual divergence between truth and proof
shouldn’t be articulated in a way that makes one
think in vague terms that arithmetic is incomplete
while logic is not: axiomatic logic is also (trivially)
theory incomplete. To avoid creating confusion
about all this, Poythress ought to define theory
completeness and carefully distinguish it from deductive completeness before proceeding to explicate Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems.
It should be clear from the above analysis that,
at least in its technical particulars, Logic falls short
Pro Rege—June 2014
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of establishing an alternative foundation for transforming Western thought; it is not even a fully adequate exposition of elementary logic. Components
essential to an introductory logic text (valid arguments, derivation) are missing or underdeveloped
or artificial, and some important notions (implication, completeness) are wrong or confused. I think
these problems may arise in large part because of
what Poythress relies upon as his main resource for
defining and treating logic—Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1910-1913). That’s
a work that treats logic as an axiomatic theory of
logical truths and that sees logical implication as
captured by conditional statements. But given that
Poythress wants to reject pagan and secular philosophy with its attendant dependence on the autonomy of logic and rationality, it’s not clear to me
why he would so strongly endorse their approach
to logic. Russell is a well-known atheist whose passion was to create an absolutely certain foundation
for all of mathematics by reducing it to logic. Since
idolizing logic in this reductionistic way is diametrically opposed to the sort of foundation Poythress
hopes to achieve, I expected him to distrust their
logicist development of logic, but he seems on the
contrary to admire it greatly (cf. 309 and 343-4).
A more modest aim regarding the role of logic
would lead one to conceptualize and systematize
logic differently. For instance, rather than taking logic to be the grand theoretical foundation
for mathematics, a view that seems to require a
Russell-style axiomatic approach, one can view
logic as formulating the laws for valid and conclusive reasoning as it actually occurs in everyday
life and in all rational disciplines. This aim is best
met by adopting a more genuine natural-deduction approach to logic, an alternative that was first
developed by Jaskowski around 1930, promoted
by Fitch in 1952, and has now been adopted in
some version by many logic texts. Organizing
logic around the idea of capturing the deductive
ways we ordinarily and correctly reason, one can
give more balanced attention to the various components of logic as well as a better explication of
the key meta-logical properties of soundness and
completeness.

12
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Theological Foundations
Having analyzed various methodological aspects
of Logic in some detail, I will now turn to examine
the theological basis Poythress has constructed for
the field of logic. This is the part of the book that is
most original with Poythress and on which he pins
his hopes of providing something truly alternative.
Since this is not my area of professional expertise,
I will merely summarize his main points, make a
few remarks, and raise some questions for further
reflection. As Poythress discusses these matters at
length throughout the book, more can certainly be
said about this than I will do here.
Poythress notes in numerous places that he is
setting out a theistic foundation for logic, in all its
parts and aspects (cf. Chapters 26, 47, 49, 57, 59,
61, and 66). But this is too generic a description
of his goal. Poythress wants to create a Christian
theological foundation for logic in order to purify
and transform the pagan and secular ways it has
been pursued throughout the history of Western
thought. For him this means relating logical ideas
and procedures to the Trinitarian God of the Old
and New Testaments. Which he does in great detail: his Scripture Index of cited texts runs to almost
five pages, four columns each.
Poythress draws upon the Bible in several ways.
There is first of all his use of Scripture passages to
illustrate various forms of valid argumentation,
something found in few other logic texts. But
because these often involve statements that talk
about Jesus Christ, God the Father, and the Holy
Spirit, they also function as opportunities for him
to expound on various attributes of God and point
out relations holding among the three persons of
the Trinity.
Since, according to Poythress, God is the Original while creatures, their properties, relations,
and activities are all reflections of the Original,
the more deeply we understand the nature of God
from Scripture, the better we’ll understand the
true character of logic (cf. Chapters 7 and 11 –
13). God is constant, dependable, faithful to his
nature, and self-consistent; human logic reflects
this consistency. God is eternal and omnipresent;
valid human arguments hold (insofar as is possible) everywhere and at all times, independent of
when and where they are made. God is omnipo-

tent, absolute, and immutable; the laws of logic are
constant, abiding, unchangeable, and necessary.
God is truthful; the laws of logic are infallibly true
and cannot be annulled.
I don’t find the pervasive use of analogies to be
a terribly persuasive way to argue for God being
intrinsically related to logic. On the other hand,
I’m certainly not opposed to making connections
between the Creator and the creation (including
logic), though I would mostly want to turn them
around, adopting what might be termed a generalized incarnational approach. Our experiential
knowledge of how the creation is structured and
operates helps us to better understand the One
who made it, also because, as Scripture indicates,
the Creator has chosen to reveal himself to us by
taking on certain features of his creation. Whether or not these are part of the essential nature of
God, I’m unwilling to speculate about; I think this
view transcends what we can rightly infer from
Scripture and creation. We can know something
of God’s faithfulness to his creation from logical
consistency, which follows from what might be
called the harmonious agreement of reality; we
can understand how God’s sovereignty over creation functions within the realm of argumentation
by seeing that valid reasoning must satisfy certain
criteria for soundness, that certain principles are
used in constructing conclusive arguments, and so
on. The structure and richness and beauty and applicability of logic reveal in some small measure
God’s greatness and loving care for his creation, as
do other aspects of human life and the wide world
around us. But I don’t think a Christian foundation for logic (or mathematics or any other creaturely reality) is properly laid by focusing on the
being and character of God.
Poythress criticizes Western logic for severing
all connections to God. While mainline thinkers
may still recognize various salient features of logic,
they refuse to ground them in God’s nature, taking
logic and rationality as autonomous. In particular,
Poythress judges that pagan and secular thinkers
exhibit their sinful rebellion against God by making logic impersonal, formal, and mechanical (cf.
Chapters 8 and 22). He admits that logic does
indeed have a sort of independence from humans
and from specific meanings, but he says that when

logic is made overly precise and formal, it is no
longer related to a personal God. His alternative is
to conceive of logic as personal. God is a person,
so logic must be personal, too. I have difficulty
grasping the exact meaning and full significance
of Poythress’s claim here, and I fail to see how developing a formal system of logic, seeing logic as
applying to argumentation whatever the information content, promotes atheism. Certainly some
Western thinkers asserted human autonomy from
God and human mastery over the world by idolatrously elevating Reason over against divine Revelation, thus denying the biblical notion of God as
sovereign Creator, but I don’t see this as cause for
rejecting the development of logic into formal systems for evaluating and constructing arguments.
As noted above, I would find this anti-Christian
trend instead a strong incentive for rejecting Russell’s logicistic approach to logic and mathematics, but here Poythress seems hesitant to pull the
trigger.
Besides emphasizing the personal nature of
God, Poythress wants to ground logic in the mystery of the Trinity. He does this in a number of
ways, treating them as providing different theological perspectives on the nature of logic (cf.

Poythress wants to create
a Christian theological
foundation for logic in order to
purify and transform the pagan
and secular ways it has been
pursued throughout the history
of Western thought.
Chapters 8, 9, 11, and Appendix F5). Here, too,
I don’t fully understand the import of his analogies. For instance, he says that God the Father
created according to a certain plan in harmony
with divine self-consistency (this corresponds to
logical consistency), God the Son speaks reality
into existence as the divine Word (corresponding
to the articulation of logical laws), and God the
Spirit holds creatures responsible to the plan for
Pro Rege—June 2014
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their existence (thus, particular arguments cannot
violate the laws of logic but instantiate them). Or,
since logic depends upon language, the Trinitarian
character of language contributes as well to a Trinitarian foundation for logic. Symbolic logic has a
referential component for the meaning of its words
and sentences, a grammatical component for properly combining words into sentences, and a syntactic component for writing or expressing words and
sentences. According to Poythress, this is all based
in the nature of the Trinity: meaning connects to
God the Father, grammar to God the Son, and
speech or expression to God the Spirit. If one were
to query why this particular assignment, Poythress
would likely appeal to the fact that God is one and
that each person of the Godhead exhibits all the
features of divine speech and logic in some respect.
These parallels may strike the reader as loose
or far-fetched, but Poythress makes an even stronger claim about the intrinsic connection between
logic and God. Based on John 1:1, which identifies Jesus as the Divine Word (Logos) made flesh,
and on Genesis 1, where God speaks to create order from chaos, Poythress concludes, “This eternal
Word is the eternal speech of God. He is therefore
also the eternal logic or reason of God. … Now it
becomes more evident why [logic] is personal. It is
not only personal, but a person, namely, the Word
of God” (71). Of course, Jesus is acknowledged to
be more than divine logic, and all persons of the
Trinity are deemed logical by virtue of their being
self-consistent, but divine logic resides principally in the second person of the Trinity. This truth
about logic stands behind all human logic, which
is but a dim reflection of eternal logic: “Logic as
we human beings experience it has roots in eternal
logic, namely, the eternal Word, the second person
of the Trinity, in fellowship with the Father and
the Spirit” (86).
Having condemned Western thinkers for making logic autonomous, an autonomy that gives
it a divine character usurping the place of God,
Poythress recognizes the need to guard against a
similar accusation of his own position. He admits
that on his account “the laws of logic … look suspiciously like the biblical idea of God” (68). So
the question naturally arises, “By claiming that the
laws of logic have divine attributes, are we divin14
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izing nature? That is, are we taking something out
of the created world, and falsely claiming that it is
divine? Is logic part of the created world? Should
we not classify it as creature rather than Creator?”
(69). Those seem like excellent questions to me.
His answer is that “logic seems to be independent
of the world. We cannot imagine a world in which
logic does not hold. This fact shows that we are
confronted with a transcendent reality. … [Thus]
logic as it really is … is an aspect of the mind of
God” (69). God himself is not subject to logic,
but His logic is no less divine, transcending created reality, because it is embodied in the second
person of the Trinity. Poythress believes that this
position doesn’t divinize logic or abrogate God’s
transcendence over his creation because our immanent creaturely logic merely reflects God’s original
eternal logic. I don’t find his response to the questions he posed very satisfying, though. It seems to
trade upon fluctuating notions of “independence”
and “transcendence,” not to mention “logic.” One
man’s analogy borders on another man’s equivocation, I suppose.
Frankly, all the theological speculation about
logic’s divine attributes—how logic must be an aspect of God’s nature, how it resides in the mind
of God, and why it is personified as one of the
persons of the Trinity—is enough to make the lay
reader a little dazed and perplexed. How can such
religious mysteries function analogically as a coherent theoretical or ontic foundation for logic?
Without knowing what God’s transcendent logic
is, how can we tell whether our human logic is a
faithful reflection of it? Where can we get trustworthy information about divine logic, from Scriptural discourse? Are tautologies such as the Law
of Excluded Middle essential parts of God’s nature?
Could God have made the laws of logic different
from what we experience them to be? Does God
make paradigm valid arguments that we should
emulate? Does God create elegant derivations of
tautologies from axiomatic truths via Modus Ponens and Substitution? Does God have a favorite
privileged set of natural deduction inference rules?
Perhaps we need to press Poythress to provide an
explicit and cogent definition of logic so that we
can better assess just what all this mystical musing
comes to. It certainly seems pious to locate logic in

the mind of God, to see an eternal version of logic
as embodied in the second person of the Trinity,
but I do not know why or that this is the case, nor,
if it were true, what difference it would make in

Frankly, all the theological
speculation about logic’s divine
attributes—how logic must be
an aspect of God’s nature, how
it resides in the mind of God,
and why it is personified as one
of the persons of the Trinity—is
enough to make the lay reader
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the organization and interpretation and application of logic, beyond providing a theological gloss.
Concluding Assessment
In the end, one might ask what this textbook does
for Christian students who desire to learn elementary logic, positioning this knowledge within a
broader Christian view of God’s world.
Readers will certainly learn a number of standard things about classical systems of logic—what
some basic syllogistic forms are and how to use
Venn Diagrams to evaluate them, how to construct truth tables and use them to define truth
functional connectives, how quantifiers and relations enter into deductive arguments, etc.—
and they will be introduced to (a certain way of
making) derivations and to various foundational
linkages between logic and mathematics; but as I
have indicated above, some significant parts of the
logical presentation are incomplete, ill-conceived,

outdated, and even confused. The technical side of
this work would no doubt have been improved by
employing a knowledgeable editor or by submitting an early draft of the text for review to people
who teach introductory logic.
In addition, students who use this book will
be exposed to an extensive presentation of Cornelius Van Til’s Trinitarian and analogical theology,
developed specially for logic by Poythress. Some
may consider this the genius of the work. Others,
however, if they manage to make it all the way
through the book, may find this aspect somewhat
tiresome, wishing the logic would be more simply
presented without overwhelming it at every stage
with theological ruminations. While I appreciate
seeing Poythress’s viewpoint worked out, I am nevertheless sympathetic to this latter sentiment: less
would have been more.
Personally, I don’t find that an analogical theological approach generates a very helpful Christian viewpoint on logic. I don’t think one should
locate logic (any variety) in the mind of God or
identify it with Jesus Christ. One need not make
connections to God’s nature and character in order to place logic in proper Christian perspective.
Like other scientific endeavors, logic studies an
important aspect of God’s creation, attempting to
determine and formulate the laws that hold for the
part of the cosmos where logical consequences and
deductive arguments are prevalent. Logic can be
used to illuminate and enrich certain parts of human experience and various rational activities, so
we are called to unfold this part of the creation. Its
scope, however, is limited. Here I fully agree with
Poythress: absolutizing logic and deductive rationality is an intellectual form of idolatry. But that
very tendency also makes me refuse to locate logic
within the divine character and being of God.
There we may have to differ profoundly.
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